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• We study the impact of supervision on tax compliance with a field experiment.
• Wemanipulate supervision through friendly deterrence.
• Results suggest that supervision leads to delayed tax payments.
• It is concluded that supervision causes a crowding out of intrinsic tax compliance.
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a b s t r a c t
We conduct a field experiment on tax compliance, focusing on newly founded firms. As a novelty the
effect of tax authorities’ supervision on timely tax payments is examined. Interestingly, results show no
positive overall effect of close supervision on tax compliance.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Taxes are important as they finance the provision of pub-
lic goods. To ensure sufficient tax funds, tax authorities enforce
compliance—mainly by inducing fear via audits and fines (Alling-
ham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973). Meta and overview
studies report that there is a tendency for deterrence to reduce tax
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0/).evasion (Fischer et al., 1992; Alm, 1999; Blackwell, 2010); however,
the effect is small or even negligible (Andreoni et al., 1998; Kirch-
ler, 2007). It has also been suggested that deterrence may crowd
out the intrinsic motivation of paying taxes (Feld and Frey, 2002;
Torgler, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2008).
Most of the empirical research on tax compliance is based on
surveys analyzing individual taxpayer self-reports and laboratory
experiments that mainly work with students. Hence, evidence on
firm tax compliance is limited (Torgler, 2002; Alm and McClellan,
2012). This gap in the empirical literature is particularly impor-
tant as firms or self-employed people have more opportunities to
engage in tax evasion and are reported to have lower tax morale
(Torgler, 2007). Laboratory experiments have been criticized for
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ability of very reliable field data such as that from the Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program of the IRS, it only permits the
exploration of limited questions and does not allow analysis of
causal relationships. Thus, controlled field experiments have re-
cently emerged as an important tool in empirical research because
they evoke real processes outside the laboratory while avoiding an
experimental demand effect, with the aim of generating causal ef-
fects (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Slemrod et al., 2001; Torgler, 2004;
Kleven et al., 2011).
To the best of our knowledge, there are only five studies that
manipulate deterrence in the field (Ariel, 2012; Hasseldine et al.,
2007; Kleven et al., 2011; Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Slemrod
et al., 2001). However, these studies mostly have individual tax-
payers as subjects and manipulate deterrence through questions,
prior audits, or through letters announcing audits in order to em-
phasize a higher perception of audit probability (threat-of-audit
letter). Hasseldine et al. (2007) report a positive impact of deter-
rence on tax behavior while Kleven et al. (2011) find a modest im-
pact. In contrast, Schwartz andOrleans (1967) andAriel (2012) find
no effect whereas Slemrod et al. (2001) observe a small positive ef-
fect for low and middle income groups and a negative impact on
high income taxpayers. However, perceived audit probability may
differ from themanipulated audit probability (Slemrod et al., 2001;
Mittone, 2006). For example, one cannot be sure that the taxpayers
actually read the letter. Additionally, the letters themselves could
be perceived as unfriendly, invoking reluctance in taxpayers be-
cause of the hostile communication and not just due to deterrence
itself. Using reported taxable income, net profit, or deductions as
measures of compliance can also be problematic as they do not di-
rectly measure tax non-compliance (no information on taxpayer
return audits).Moreover, earnings generated in the informal sector
are not reported in taxable income. Audits also struggle to detect
tax evasion through informal activities which leads to measure-
ment biases in tax evasion and therefore lower-bound estimates
(Kleven et al., 2011).
The strength of our study is that it uses firm data and a field
experiment to provide further evidence on tax compliance. In ad-
dition, as a novelty, we explore the influence on the compliance
of close supervision by the tax administration. Supervision is de-
fined as a friendly and constant form of deterrence and interaction
with the firms. This allows controlling for awareness of the audit-
ing while avoiding communication that is perceived as unfriendly.
To reduce any historical or firm-specific experiences with the tax
administration we focus only on newly founded firms. In addition,
we explore firms that are classified as high-risk groups in regard to
tax evasion. To avoid tax compliance measurement biases we an-
alyze the timely payment of taxes and the amount of the delayed
taxes that were not paid.
2. Sample
The sample consists of all the 1721 firms that began operation
during the year 2011within the tax district ‘‘East-Styria’’ in Austria.
Each of these businesses was obliged to pay its full taxes before
November 15, 2012. Ninety-three of these firms were randomly
selected, mostly among the high-risk businesses in terms of tax
evasion (gastronomy: 54.8%, construction: 22.6%, trading: 19.4%,
mining: 1.1%, counseling: 1.1%) to compose the treatment group
that we call ‘‘supervision’’. The remaining 1628 enterprises com-
prise the non-treatment group of which 35.5% are high-risk
businesses (gastronomy: 4.2%, construction: 6.4%, trading: 14.5%,
mining: 0.1%, counseling: 10.3%) and 65.5% low-risk businesses,
mostly in the real estate (19.6%), service (8.2%) and agriculture
business (7.2%). It should be noted that we will also present re-
sults limiting this control group to only those sectors who appearin the treatment group. Most enterprises had a turnover of up to
29,999 Euro (treatment group: 62.4%, non-treatment group: 74.2%;
p = 0.07). Finally, the majority of firms had the legal status of
a natural person (treatment group: 79.6%, non-treatment group:
72.2%, p = 0.22) and an employed tax practitioner (treatment
group: 86.0%, non-treatment group: 69.9%; p = 0.003). Using
a multivariate analysis we control for the legal status of a firm,
turnover, and the tax practitioner.
3. Procedure
The supervision consisted of two parts: (a) an introductory visit,
and (b) constant auditing throughout the first year of the firm. Both
phases were conducted and administered by a tax auditor. The in-
troductory visit took place at the firm following an application for
a tax number. The tax auditor offered advice regarding the tax law
and the subsequent rights and duties of a taxpayer, handed out in-
formation brochures and give-aways (a pen, a pad, and a candy).
The tax auditor explicitly used friendly and respectful communi-
cation and invited the firms to contact the auditor if there were
any further questions. Importantly, the auditor informed the firm
that he/she would audit the reports and payment liabilities on a
monthly basis throughout the year. The component of constant
auditing ensured that the tax auditor monitored the tax files of
the enterprise each month according to Austrian tax law. All other
firms that were not part of the treatment were deliberately not
contacted, informed, or audited by the tax authorities.
4. Measurements
According to the IRS, tax compliance comprises three aspects:
accurate reporting, timely filing, and timely paying (Slemrod et al.,
2001). As mentioned previously we only focus on timely paying
as the quality and frequency of an audit make accurate reporting
comparatively hard to assess. The variable on timely payment
has no measurement errors as one is able to assess whether a
taxpayer paid before or after the deadline, which is November 15
for Austrian firms. Thus,we compiled the anonymized tax accounts
of December 15, 2012, including all taxes from 2011 (VAT, income
tax, property tax etc.). Obviously, at this date all taxes owing can be
considered as late. Accordingly, timely payment is assessed as both
a dichotomous (paid in time or not) and a continuous (amount of
tax due for those who are late) variable. The continuous variable
was logarithmized to take into account the skewed distribution of
the variable’s values (skewness = −1.98).
Additionally, we clustered the analyses over the business sec-
tor and included as control variables the turnover, legal status, and
whether they have used a tax practitioner. The opportunity of tax
evasion is seen as one of the most important determinants of tax
compliance (Engström and Holmlund, 2009; Kleven et al., 2011).
Certain types of businesses such as gastronomy, construction or
trading operate with cash and thus have increased opportunities
to engage in tax evasion than, for example, real estate businesses.
The legal status allows us to differentiate between one-person en-
terprises and larger enterprises. Finally, involvement of a tax prac-
titioner is an important factor for tax compliance. There is evidence
that tax practitioners increase non-compliance (Erard, 1993) and
that changes in tax authorities’ interaction style influence tax com-
pliance of taxpayers who prepare their own taxes but not of those
who employ a tax practitioner (Hasseldine et al., 2007).
5. Results
In the following, two regression analyses are presented
(Table 1). First we use a probit model to explore whether our treat-
ment has an influence on timely paying (specification 1–3). We
then restrict our sample to those cases where firms did not pay on
time, using OLS specifications to analyze whether the treatment
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Effect of supervision on not paying on time and the amount of delayed tax payment.
Dependent variable Paying on time Amount of delayed tax payment
Model Probit OLS regression
Clustering over business sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supervision 0.475*** 0.450*** 0.327*** −0.311 −0.699***
4.68 4.76 5.24 −1.08 −3.84
0.120 0.112 0.092
30,000–90,999 0.420* 0.395* 0.129 −0.223 −1.194
Euro turnover 2.34 2.14 0.66 −0.37 −1.35
0.102 0.095 0.034
100,000–219,999 0.184 0.166 0.009 −0.714 −0.684
Euro turnover 0.77 0.69 0.04 −0.68 −0.58
0.041 0.037 0.002
220,000–699,999 −0.035 −0.064 −0.066 2.565*** 1.817*
Euro turnover −0.13 −0.23 −0.19 5.18 3.85
−0.007 −0.012 −0.016
700,000–9.679,999 0.422a 0.396 −0.069 0.101 −0.903
Euro turnover 1.69 1.58 −0.34 0.09 −0.43
0.106 0.098 −0.017
Natural person 0.513** 0.527** 0.880* −0.361 0.053
3.02 3.19 2.57 −0.80 0.30
0.089 0.091 0.179
Limited liability corporation 0.975*** 0.941*** 1.266** −0.904 −0.102
4.60 4.39 3.29 −1.21 −0.15
0.283 0.270 0.428
Limited partnership 0.083** 0.799** 0.966a 0.882 0.442
2.80 2.79 1.83 1.14 1.11
0.241 0.231 0.330
Commercial corporation 0.570a 0.556a 1.012* −3.571 −3.509
1.69 1.67 2.09 −1.61 −1.42
0.152 0.147 0.348
Tax practitioner 0.171a 0.233 0.084 −0.31
1.66 1.54 0.18 −0.66
0.033 0.056
Observations 1713 1713 714 227 130
Pseudo R2 0.0497 0.0523 0.0368 0.079 0.1594
Note: z-values and t-values are given in italics, marginal effects in bold.
a Represent statistical significance at the 10 (p < .10).
* Represent statistical significance at the 5 (p < .05).
** Represent statistical significance at the 1 (p < .01).
*** Represent statistical significance at the 0.1 (p < .001) levels, respectively; the reference group
of turnover is 0–29,999 Euro, the reference group for legal status consists of all the other possibilities
(club, business partnership, consortium, civil law association, capital company, hiring association, silent
partnership, and house owner association).influences the amount of the delayed tax (specification 4–5). In
specifications 3 and 5 we provide a robustness check by restrict-
ing the control group sample to only those industries that appear
in the treatment group (high-risk firms). In all specifications stan-
dard errors are clustered by business sectors to capture unobserved
sector-specific characteristics. For paying on time the results re-
port that the coefficient for our treatment variable is always sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level with marginal effects between
9.2% and 12%. Thus, the results on timely paying indicate that the
supervision actually crowds-out compliance.
When exploring the amount of tax owed by non-compliant
firms (those that did not pay on time) we actually observe that su-
pervision has a positive effect, reducing the amount of tax due. In
specification 4 we control for turnover, legal status, and tax practi-
tioner: the resulting coefficient is far from statistically significant.
However, whenwe restrict our sample to the same business indus-
tries as in the control group, the coefficient becomes highly statis-
tically significant. The estimated reduction of the amount of tax
due based on supervision is between 27% (100[exp(−0.311)− 1],
specification 4) and 50% (specification 5) taking into account that
the average tax due in our data set is 2723 Euro (SD = 6546).
To better acknowledge observable differences between control
and treatment group that can also be seen when estimating the
propensity score, namely the conditional probability of receiving
a treatment given pretreatment characteristics (see Table A.1),
we report in Table 2 estimations of average treatment effectsbased on propensity score matching. We report several methods
jointly to offer a better assessment of the robustness of estimates.1
The results reported in Table 1 remain robust. The ATT (Average
effect of Treatment on Treated) is always statistically significant for
paying on time but not for the amount of delayed tax payment.
6. Discussion
The reported results indicate that supervision can backfire.
Rather than increasing tax compliance, even a friendly version of
deterrence reduces tax compliance. Thus, supervision seems to
crowd out the intrinsic motivation of tax compliance (Feld and
Frey, 2002; Torgler, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2008). It might be that
such interventions are perceived as too controlling, which reduces
self-determination and self-esteem, thereby decreasing intrinsic
motivation. Such an effect is observed in the literature on work
morale (Frey, 1997a). There is also evidence that sanctions are
perceived as a ‘‘price’’. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
observe that the introduction of a fine for parents arriving late to
a day-care center was perceived as a price rather than as a signal
encouraging on-time collection of children. Therefore, delayed
pick-up of children increased andwas persistent even after the fine
was removed.
1 For a discussion see Becker and Ichino (2002) and Guo and Fraser (2010).
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Estimation of average treatment effects based on propensity scores using various matching
methods.
n. treat. n. control. ATT Std. Err. t
Not Paying on Time (logit)
Matching
Nearest-Neighbor 93 1480 0.132 0.048 2.715
Nearest-Neighbor bootstrapping 93 1480 0.132 0.05 2.622
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Kernel (Gaussian) 93 1627 0.143 0.048 2.974
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Stratification 93 1627 0.129 0.049 2.638
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Amount of delayed tax payment
Matching
Nearest-Neighbor 93 168 −0.616 0.377 −1.631
Nearest-Neighbor bootstrapping 93 168 −0.616 0.776 −0.793
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Kernel (Gaussian) 93 1627 −0.689 0.707 −0.975
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Stratification 93 1627 −0.885 0.635 −1.393
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Note: ATT: Average effect of the Treatment on Treated.Thus, it does not seem that this external intervention was per-
ceived as supportive despite establishing a personal relationship
between the tax administration and the taxpayerwhich could have
been expected to reduce crowding-out of the firm’s intrinsic mo-
tivation to pay taxes (Frey, 1997b). On the other hand, for those
who were non-compliant, supervision tends to reduce the amount
of late taxes due, particularly when restricting the sample size to
high-risk industries.
In sum, the negative effect of supervision on timely paying and
the positive effect on the tax due which was not statistically sig-
nificant in most of the estimates lead to the conclusion that close
supervision of newly created high-risk firms offers no overall posi-
tive effect on tax compliance. Accordingly, alternatives to enforce-
mentmeasurements such as service and/or trust approachesmight
be recommended to the tax administration to increase tax compli-
ance (Alm and Torgler, 2011).
It should be noted that the study has some limitations. The
present outcomesmight not apply to countries with a different tax
culture to Austria (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Balliet and van Lange,
2013). Also, the relatively small sample size of our treatment group
makes it necessary to replicate the current outcome with a larger
treatment sample and in other countries. It might be argued that
supervised firms have adapted their behavior based on the ad-
ditional information available (e.g., a better understanding of the
sanctions for paying late, which are not that severe after all). Ad-
ditionally, it can be argued that the inexperienced non-treatment
group faced amuchmore ambiguous situation than the supervised
firms causing them perhaps to be more risk averse with respect to
reporting, and as a result more tax compliant.
To conclude, tax authorities are recommended to invest in fur-
ther services such as telephone hotlines or a website to increase
tax compliance (Braithwaite et al., 2007; Alm and Torgler, 2011;
Gangl et al., 2013). Future research could study the effects of such
services in the field to determine whether it is possible to gener-
alize the positive impact of ‘‘soft-factors’’ reported in survey and
laboratory studies.
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Probit estimates Coef. z
30,000–90,999 Euro turnover 0.630*** 4.49
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700,000–9.679,999 Euro turnover −0.035 −0.08
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Tax practitioner 0.485*** 3.61
N 1721
Pseudo R2 0.088
Note: Common support condition imposed. Region of common support is
[.0044, .3820]. Balancing property is satisfied with the reported specification.
Number of blocks: 4.
* Represent statistical significance at the 10% (p < .10) levels.
** Represent statistical significance at the 5% (p < .05) levels.
*** Represent statistical significance at the 1% (p < .01) and 0.1% (p < .001) levels.
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